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This  paper  uses  new  Japanese  panel  data  to  estimate  the  impact  of  various  human  resource 
management  practices  (HRMP’s)  on  productive  efficiency.  These  include  information  sharing 
devices,  such  as joint  labor-management  committees(JLMC’s)  and  non-union  employee 
associations  (NUEA’s),  and  financial  participation  schemes,  such  as  profit  sharing  plans(PSP’s) 
and  employee  stock  ownership  plans  (ESOP’s).  By  merging  data  from  a  new  survey 
concerning  HRMP’s  among  publicly-held  Japanese  firms  with  two  other  public  data  sources, 
we  create  for  the  first  time  a enterprise-level  panel  data  set  for  Japanese  firms  that  provides 
information  annually  for  1970-85  on  both  information  sharing  and  financial  participation.  The 
data  are  then  used  to  estimate  translog  production  functions  augmented  by  variables  to  capture 
the  effects  of  information  sharing  and  financial  participation.  The  estimations  yield  the  first 
econometric  evidence  on  the  productivity  effects  of  diverse  HRMP’s  in  Japan.  The  key 
findings  include:  (i)  there  are  significant  productivity-enhancing  effects  for  JLMC’s,  NUEA’s, 
PSP’s  and  ESOP’s;  (ii)  these  productivity  gains  will  change  as  HRMP’s  age.  For  instance,  the 
introduction  of  a JLMC  boosts  productivity  initially  by  9  percent  annually.  The  productivity 
gains  rise  over  time  and  reach  their  highest  point  (11  percent)  23  years  after  the  introduction 
of  the  JLMC.  After  their  highest  point,  the  productivity  gains  gradually  diminish  and 
eventually  call  for  the  implementation  of  a  new  innovation  in  information  sharing;  (iii)  there 
is  a  significant  complementarity  between  information  sharing  and  PSP’s;  and  (iv)  the  favorable 
productivity  effects  of  information  sharing  are  reinforced  by  the  presence  of  formal  trade 
unions,  pointing  to  a complementarity  between  information  sharing  and  unions. I.  Introduction 
Among  the  most  important  policy  questions  confronting  the  leading  western  economies 
today  is  how  to  raise  the  disappointing  rate  of  productivity  growth  and  thus  improve 
economic  competitiveness.  In  searching  for  the  key  to  enhancing  competitiveness,  many 
economists  and  policymakers  turn  to  the  case  of  Japan’s  high  postwar  productivity  growth.’ 
In  accounting  for  Japan’s  strong  economic  performance,  especially  in  manufacturing, 
many  emphasize  a Japanese  system  of  labor-management  relations  that,  compared  to  the 
traditionally  adversarial  system  characteristic  of  the  US,  is  perceived  to  be  much  more 
cooperative  and  based  on  far  more  trust  between  labor  and  management  (e.g.  Aoki,  1988; 
Levine  and  Tyson,  1990).  The  contribution  of  particular  Japanese  institutions  is  often 
stressed.  Thus  Hashimoto  (e.g.,1990)  directs  attention  to  the  role  of  three  institutions  -  the 
shushin  kovo  system  which  guarantees  long  term  employment,  the  nenko  chingin  system, 
which  provides  for  seniority  wages,  and  enterprise  unionisms.  For  Koike  (1988)  the  key  is  the 
scope  and  nature  of  on-the-job  training  received  by  the  average  Japanese  worker  typically  by 
job  rotation.  Also,  most  authorities  argue  that  the  labor  market  exhibits  far  more  flexibility 
than  in  the  US. 
In  reviewing  these  different  views  we  are  struck  by  the  scarcity  of  systematic 
investigation  of  the  potentially  important  roles  of  Human  Resource  Management  Practices 
(HRMP’s)  in  Japan,  especially  various  financial  participation  schemes  and  a  variety  of 
‘See,  for  instance,  Blinder  (1990),  Thurow  (1986),  Levine  and  Tyson  (1990),  the  MIT 
Commission  on  Industrial  Productivity  (1989). 2 
information  sharing  devices.  For  financial  participation,  Freeman  and  Weitzman  (1987)  that 
use  industry-level  aggregate  data  to  show  the  statistically  significant  positive  correlations 
between  bonuses  and  employment  level.  However,  Brunello  (1991)  uses  firm-level  micro 
data,  from  which  industry-level  data  are  aggregated,  to  account  for  a number  of  potential 
biases  inherent  in  the  use  of  aggregate  data,  and  finds  no  statistically  significant  positive  cor- 
relations  between  bonuses  and  employment  level  for  the  electric  machinery,  car  and  steel 
industries.*  Recently,  Jones  and  Kato  (1995)  use  firm-level  panel  data  to  find  that  the 
introduction  of  an  ESOP  will  lead  to  a 4  to  5 percent  increase  in  productivity;  this 
productivity  payoff  does  not  appear  immediately;  and  there  is  a  modest  productivity  gain  from 
the  bonus  system.  For  information  sharing  Morishima  (1991 a;  1991 b)  use  firm-level  micro 
data  to  find  the  statistically  significant  positive  correlations  between  the  extent  of  information 
sharing  through  Joint  Labor  Management  Committees  (JLMC’s)  and  productivity,  and  the 
statistically  significant  correlations  between  stronger  JLMC’s  and  shorter  and  smoother  wage 
negotiation. 
Nevertheless,  no  study  has  been  able  to  consider  both  financial  participation  schemes 
and  information  sharing  devices  simultaneously.  This  weakness  in  the  available  empirical 
evidence  is  especially  troublesome  since  several  authors  have  recently  developed  hypotheses 
that  some  HRMP’s  may  be  more  effective  when  used  in  combination  with  other  HRMP’s  (see, 
for  instance,  Fitzroy  and  Kraft,  1987;  Weitzman  and  Kruse,  1990;  Levine  and  Tyson,  1990; 
Jones  and  Pliskin,  1991;  Ben-Ner  and  Jones,  1992;  Ichniowski,  Shaw  and  Prennushi,  1993). 
A  main  obstacle  to  systematic  studies  of  the  economic  effects  of  HRMP’s  in  Japan  was 
‘He  does  find,  however,  the  statistically  significant  positive  correlation  between  bonuses 
and  employment  level  for  the  textiles  industry. 3 
the  absence  of  micro  data,  especially  panel  data  providing  information  on  various  HRMP’s  of 
Japanese  firms.  Thus,  we  decided  to  conduct  a survey  of  Japanese  firms,  the  HRM  Survey  of 
Japanese  Firms,  from  which  such  panel  data  can  be  assembled.  The  survey  was  administered 
at  Keio  University’s  Keio  Economic  Observatory  during  the  summer  of  1993.  The  sample 
universe  of  the  HRM  Survey  of  Japanese  firms  was  the  Toyo  Keizai  Kaisha  Shiki  Ho  that 
provides  a  list  of  all  firms  listed  in  Japan’s  three  major  stock  exchanges,  Tokyo,  Osaka  and 
Nagoya.  In  1993  there  were  2,127  firms  listed  in  those  three  exchanges.3 
The  survey  itself  was  preceded  by  a pilot  phase  in  which  an  earlier  version  of  the 
instrument  was  tested  on  human  resource  managers  of  several  firms  as  well  as  on  researchers 
of  the  Japan  Institute  of  Labor,  the  Japan  Productivity  Center,  and  the  Japan  Securities 
Research  Institute  who  conducted  similar  yet  smaller  surveys  in  the  past.  On  the  basis  of 
what  we  learned  from  this,  the  questionnaire  was  revised.  The  final  version  of  the 
questionnaires  were  mailed  to  all  2,127  firms  using  a list  of  addresses  from  the  Toyo  Keizai 
Kaisha  Shiki  Ho  in  August  of  1993. 
We  received  usable  responses  from  371  firms  (a  response  rate  of  17%).  Among  those, 
there  were  226  firms  in  manufacturing.  The  response  rate  of  17%  is  comparable  or  slightly 
higher  than  most  prior  surveys  of  similar  nature  in  Japan.  For  instance,  in  June  of  1991,  the 
Rengo  Sogo  Seikatsu  Kaihatsu  Kenkyu  Jo  (Rengo  Research  Institute  of  General  Life 
Development)  mailed  their  questionnaire  asking  various  questions  on  labor  conditions  and 
information  sharing  to  6,800  firms  in  Japan  and  received  usable  responses  from  689  firms  (a 
response  rate  of  10%).  In  June  of  1989,  the  Japan  Productivity  Center  mailed  their 
30ur  sample  universe  is  virtually  a list  of  all  listed  firms  in  Japan.  The  only  listed  firms 
not  included  in  the  sample  universe  are  a very  small  number  of  firms  listed  only  in  other  local 
stock  exchanges  (about  three  dozens). questionnaire  asking  various  questions  on  HRMP’s  to  1030  firms  in  Japan  and  received  usable 
responses  from  203  firms  (a  response  rate  of  19.7%). 
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In  this  paper  we  merge  data  from  this  new  survey  with  two  other  public  data  sources 
to  create  for  the  first  time  a panel  data  set  for  Japanese  manufacturing  firms  that  provides 
information  on  both  information  sharing  and  financial  participation,  specifically  JLMC’s,  Non- 
Union  Employee  Associations  (NUEA’s),  Profit  Sharing  plans  (PSP’s)  and  ESOP’s. 
The  data  are  then  used  to  estimate  translog  production  functions  augmented  by 
variables  to  capture  the  effects  of  information  sharing  through  JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s,  and 
financial  participation  by  PSP’s  and  ESOP’s.  We  find  significant  productivity-enhancing 
effects  for  all  four  HRMP’s.  We  further  find  that  these  productivity  gains  will  change  as 
HRMP’s  age.  For  instance,  the  introduction  of  a JLMC  boosts  productivity  initially  by  9% 
annually.  The  productivity  gains  will  then  rise  as  time  goes  by  and  will  reach  their  highest 
(11%)  23  years  after  the  introduction  of  the  JLMC. 
With  regard  to  the  interactions  amongst  these  HRMP’s,  we  find  a significant 
complementarity  between  NUEA’s  and  PSP’s.  However,  we  also  find  that  ESOP’s  and 
information  sharing  either  via  JLMC’s  or  via  NUEA’s  are  substitutes. 
Finally,  we  explore  the  link  between  these  HRMP’s  and  trade  unions.  We  confirm  that 
the  key  findings  concerning  the  productivity  effects  of  these  four  HRMP’s  do  not  change 
when  unions  are  considered.  We  further  find  that  unions  and  information  sharing  are 
complementary. 
Our  findings,  we  believe,  are  particularly  timely  in  light  of  the  recent  Dunlop 
commission  report  documenting  a growing  interest  in  employee  participation  and  labor- 
management  cooperation  by  both  labor  and  management  in  the  United  States  whereas 5 
realizing  that  “employee  participation  and  labor-management  cooperation  are  fragile  and  are 
difficult  to  sustain  and  diffuse  in  the  American  environment  (Commission  on  the  Future  of 
Worker-Management  Relations,  1994:  56).”  In  contrast  to  the  “American  environment”  that 
tends  to  limit  the  diffusion  of  employee  participation  and  labor-management  cooperation  and 
restrict  their  survival  once  adopted,  employee  participation  and  labor-management  cooperation 
are  wide-spread  and  deep-rooted  in  Japan.  A  closer  look  at  the  Japanese  experience  of 
employee  participation  and  labor-management  cooperation  and  their  effects  on  work-place 
productivity  and,  thus,  competitiveness  appears  to  be  of  particular  public  policy  interest  for 
many  countries  considering  participatory  HRMP’s  a way  to  improve  their  productivity 
performance  and  thus  competitiveness. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  provide  institutional 
information  on  JLMC’s,  NUEA’s,  PSP’s  and  ESOP’S.~  Section  III  offers  theoretical  arguments 
for  the  productivity 
strategy.  In  section 
section. 
effects  of  these  practices,  while  section  IV  provides  the  basic  empirical 
V  we  present  our  main  empirical  results,  followed  by  a concluding 
II.  Institutions 
A.  Joint  Labor  Management  Committees  (JLMC’s) 
One  of  the  core  mechanisms  for  labor-management  relations  within  a  large  Japanese 
4The  HRM  Survey  of  Japanese  Firms  also  asked  about  small  group  activities  such  as  QC 
circles.  Unfortunately,  since  many  more  firms  declined  to  respond  to  these  questions  than 
questions  on  other  HRMP’s,  including  small  group  activities  will  result  in  a  substantial 
reduction  of  the  sample  size  of  our  panel  data.  Furthermore,  our  preliminary  investigation 
including  them  suggested  that  they  may  be  less  important  than  other  HRMP’s.  Thus,  in  this 
paper  we  decided  not  to  consider  them.  However,  we  will  revisit  these  in  our  future  work 
where  we  do  not  have  to  be  so  parsimonious. 6 
firm  is  the  joint  labor-management  committees  (JLMC’s).  Established  at  the  corporate  level 
and  involving  both  top  corporate  and  union  representatives,  JLMC’s  serve  as  a mechanism  for 
information  sharing  and  labor  consultation  on  a large  variety  of  issues  ranging  from  basic 
business  policies  to  working  conditions.  The  Ministry  of  Labour  survey  conducted  in  1988 
showed  that  about  72%  of  the  firms  with  100  or  more  regular  employees  had  a  standing 
JLMC.  Among  large  firms  with  1,000  or  more  employees,  88.4%  reported  having  standing 
JLMC’s,  while  63.3%  of  firms  with  fewer  than  1,000  regular  workers  had  JLMC’s.  While  the 
proportion  of  firms  with  JLMC’s  is  substantially  higher  in  unionized  firms  (around  90%), 
40.3%  of  non-union  firms  also  reported  having  standing  JLMC’s.  Our  survey  of  Japanese 
Firms  gives  the  most  recent  picture  as  of  1993.  In  our  sample,  close  to  80%  of  firms  reported 
to  have  standing  JLMC’s. 
Unlike  German  works  councils,  the  establishment  of  JLMC’s  is  not  obligatory  under 
the  Japanese  law,  and  therefore,  voluntary.  When  there  is  a union,  labor-side  representatives 
are  almost  always  union  representatives,  while  even  in  the  absence  of  unions,  the  majority  of 
labors-side  JLMC  members  are  elected  by  employee  vote  (about  70%,  Koike,  1978).  Thus, 
while  the  establishment  of  a JLMC  is  voluntary  on  the  side  of  management,  JLMC  members 
usually  legitimately  represent  the  interests  of  the  firm  workforce,  making  JLMC’s  a form  of 
representative  participation  (Levine  and  Tyson,  1988). 
According  to  Shimada  (1992),  JLMC’s  were  one  of  the  many  labor-management 
institutions  proposed  at  the  beginning  of  1950s  by  the  Japan  Productivity  Center.  After  a 
decade  of  tumultuous  labor-management  relations  between  1945  and  1955,  Japanese  unions 
and  management,  with  the  endorsement  from  the  central  government,  began  to  implement  a 
number  of  well-known  human  resource  management  techniques  including  JLMC’s,  quality 7 
control  circles,  and  semi-annual  bonus  payments  to  all  employees.  JLMC’s  were  the  hallmark 
of  the  labor-management  communication  institutions  proposed  and  widely  diffused  during  the 
late  1950s  and  1960s.  According  to  our  survey,  in  1950  about  20  percent  of  firms  had 
standing  corporate  JLMC’s.  During  the  next  two  decades,  the  institution  diffused  rapidly  (at  a 
rate  of  about  20  percentage  points  for  each  decade.  Thus,  by  1970  the  figure  had  risen  to 
close  to  60  percent.  For  the  next  two  decades  the  institution  diffused  steadily,  and,  as  of 
1993,  fully  80  percent  of  firms  reported  to  have  standing  JLMC’s  at  the  corporate  level. 
Many  observers  attribute  the  peaceful  firm-level  labor  relations  observed  in  Japanese 
firms  to  the  establishment  of  JLMC’s  (Shimada,  .1992;  Inagami,  1988).  Within  JLMC’s, 
which  meet  almost  once  a month  (an  average  of  11 times  a year  according  to  our  survey),  a 
number  of  issues  are  discussed,  ranging  from  basic  business  policies  to  social  and  athletic 
activities  sponsored  by  the  firm.  According  to  a survey  conducted  by  the  Policy  Planning  and 
Research  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Labour  in  1985  on  the  types  of  issues  discussed  in 
JLMC’s  and  the  degree  of  employee  participation  in  each  issue  (quoted  in  Inagami,  1988), 
firms  use  JLMC’s  at  least  for  information  sharing  on  a wide  variety  of  issues.  In  particular, 
more  than  60%  of  the  firms  use  JLMC’s  for  information  sharing  for  basic  management 
decisions  such  as  business  strategies  and  production  and  sales  plans.  However,  in  many 
cases,  the  degree  of  employee  influence  with  regard  to  these  issues  is  small,  with  almost  79% 
of  the  firms  only  sharing  information  but  not  going  any  further.  In  contrast,  when  the  issues 
more  directly  relate  to  employment  conditions  (such  as  working  hours  and  holidays,  wages 
and  bonuses,  and  layoffs  and  employment  adjustment),  a large  proportion  of  firms  use  JLMC’s 
to  consult  with  labor  and  even  to  allow  employee  representatives  to  participate  in joint 
decision  making.  For  example,  out  of  the  firms  that  discuss  wage  and  employment  security 8 
issues,  more  than  87%  of  the  firms  at  least  consult  with  labor  representatives  prior  to  making 
these  plans  and  32  to  34%  of  the  firms  practice  joint  decision  making.  Thus,  for  direct  labor 
issues,  JLMC’s  appear  to  go  beyond  simple  information  sharing  and  serve  a function  of 
labor-management  consultation  and  even  joint  decision  making.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
such  use  of  JLMC’s  blur  the  distinction  between  collective  bargaining  and  joint  consultation 
in  Japanese  labor-management  relations,  an  issue  which  has  attracted  a policy  debate  recently 
(Morishima,  1992). 
B.  Non-Union  Emulovee  Associations  (NUEA’sl 
Aside  from  JLMC’s  and  formal  trade  unions,  many  Japanese  corporations  have  an 
employee  association  often  called  SHAIN  KAI,  or  SHINBOKU  KAI.  The  nature  and  scope 
of  these  NUEA’s  have  not  been  well  understood  largely  due  to  the  absence  of  reliable 
evidence.  Our  survey  is  one  of  the  first  to  provide  information  in  some  detail  on  NUEA’s. 
According  to  the  survey,  the  majority  of  responding  firms  (53%)  had  a NUEA.  They  are 
more  prevalent  in  firms  without  unions  (81%  of  firms  without  unions  had  a NUEA  whereas 
48%  of  firms  with  unions  had  a NUEA).  Two-third  of  firms  with  NUEA’s  reported  the 
inclusion  of  senior  managers  in  the  membership  of  their  NUEA’s,  and  close  to  80%  of  them 
reported  the  presence  of  company  subsidy.  In  this  regard,  legally  they  cannot  be  considered 
trade  unions.  While  comparable  statistics  are  hard  to  obtain,  Sato  (1994)  reports  that  in  his 
sample  of  small  and  medium-sized  firms  (N=375),  63.7%  had  some  type  of  NUEA’s.  The 
proportion  was  lower  among  unionized  firms  (43.3%)  and  increases  as  firm  size  goes  down. 
Since  other  studies  have  also  found  that  the  proportion  of  firms  with  NUEA’s  also  increases 
with  declining  firms  size,  we  assume  that  the  difference  between  our  results  and  those  of  Sato 9 
(1994)  are  because  our  sample  mainly  includes  large  firms.  The  function  that  is  often 
associated  with  NUEA’s,  as  the  Japanese  name  implies,  is  to  organize  and  sponsor  social  and 
recreational  activities  for  company  employees.  Some  argue,  however,  that  in  some  cases, 
NUEA’s  play  an  important  role  of  giving  employees  voice,  especially  in  the  absence  of  formal 
unions  (Koike,  1988;  199,  Osawa,  1989,  7;  Sato,  1994).  For  example,  Sato  (1994)  reported 
that  in  his  survey,  approximately  one  third  of  NUEA’s  are  what  he  calls  “NUEA’s  with  Voice” 
whereas  the  rest  are  “NUEA’s  for  social  activities.”  Sato  (1994)  defines  “NUEA’s  with 
Voice”  as  those  that  engage  in  negotiations  over  employment  contract  and/or  those  that  have 
the  ability  to  voice  employee  concerns  in  the  management  of  the  firms.  According  to  a 
survey  done  by  Tokyo  Municipal  Labor  Research  Center  in  1990,  about  32%  of  the  NUEA’s 
they  surveyed  had  “union-like”  functions,  referring  to  the  ability  to  negotiate  employment 
conditions.  Thus,  available  evidence  suggests  that  NUEA’s  are  more  prevalent  in  smaller, 
non-union  firms,  and  when  established,  approximately  one-third  of  them  act  like  “unions.” 
However,  even  when  NUEA’s  do  not  engage  in  contract  negotiation,  this  does  not  preclude 
the  possibility  that  they  facilitate  information  sharing  or  effectively  carry  out  other 
representational  functions,  similar  to  those  associated  with  JLMC’s.  Sato  (1994)‘s  evidence 
indicates  that  in  his  sample,  41.3%  of  the  NUEA’s  are  used  by  management  as  a mechanism 
to  inform  employees  of  the  management  policies  and  business  plans,  and  28.3%  are  used  by 
management  gather  information  on  employees’  reaction  to  management  proposed  management 
policies  and  business  plans.  These  percentages  increase  when  NUEA’s  have  negotiating  roles. 
Thus,  the  evidence  indicates  that  similar  to  JLMC’s,  NUEA’s  also  have  information  sharing 
and  consultation  functions,  although  to  a lesser  degree.  In  addition,  according  to  Sato  (1994), 
NUEA’s  also  serve  as  management’s  tools  to  collect  information  on  employee  preferences  and 10 
wishes  (54.9%)  and,  as  noted  earlier,  to  facilitate  social  activities  among  employees  (82.4%). 
Finally,  there  is  some  evidence  that  union-like  NUEA’s  are  considered  to  be  substitutes  for 
bona  fide  labor  unions  by  both  management  and  labor.  Sato  (1994)  reports  that  the 
proportion  of  employers  who  consider  that  unions  “do  not  have  a place  in  our  firm”  is  higher 
among  those  firms  with  union-like  NUEA’s  (30.5%)  than  the  overall  average  (20.8%). 
Our  HRM  Survey  of  Japanese  Firms  also  reveals  for  the  first  time  the  diffusion  of 
NUEA’s  among  Japanese  firms  in  the  postwar  era.  In  1950  only  one  in  ten  firms  had  a 
NUEA.  The  proportion  of  firms  with  NUEA’s  grew  steadily  since  then,  reaching  45  percent 
by  1980.  The  diffusion  of  NUEA’s  slowed  down  during  the  last  decade;  in  1993,  one  in  two 
firms  reported  to  have  a NUEA. 
C.  Profit  Sharing  Plans  (PSP’s) 
PSP’s  are  a pay  system  in  which  the  total  amount  of  bonuses  are  linked  to  a  measure 
of  firm  performance,  such  as  profit.  The  Japanese  bonus  payment  system  has  attracted 
considerable  attention  and  controversy,  in  particular  the  claim  (e.g.  Freeman  and  Weitzman, 
1987)  that  it  is  a form  of  a PSP.  In  light  of  the  ongoing  debate  between  those  who  stress  the 
profit  sharing  aspect  of  the  Japanese  bonus  system  (e.g.,  Freeman  and  Weitzman,  1987)  and 
those  who  downplay  it  (e.g.,  Ohashi,  1989,  Brunello,  1991),  we  consider  only  the  least 
controversial  (with  respect  to  the  profit-sharing  aspect  of  the  bonus  payment  system)  types  of 
the  bonus  payment  system,  i.e.,  the  bonus  payment  system  with  a formal  contract  stipulating 
the  terms  of  the  profit-sharing  plan. According  to  our  survey,  one  in  four  firms  had  a PSP  in  1993.5  The  proportion 
firms  with  a PSP  was  only  5 percent  in  1960  and  grew  steadily  to  14 percent  by  1980. 
significant  diffusion  occurred  during  1980s  however,  with  the  proportion  of  firms  with 





Our  survey  also  reveals  that  PSP’s  are  more  prevalent  in  smaller  firms.  For  instance, 
the  proportion  of  firms  with  5,000  or  more  employees  that  had  a PSP  was  only  11  percent. 
PSP’s  are  more  wide-spread  in  the  non-union  sector  (more  than  40  percent  of  firms  without 
union  had  a  PSP  in  1993). 
The  large  majority  (70  percent)  of  firms  with  a PSP  reported  separate  profit-sharing 
plans  for  officers  and  non-officers.  However,  Japanese  PSP’s  do  not  normally  distinguish 
between  union  and  non-union  members  (only  one-thirds  of  firms  with  PSP’s  reported  separate 
PSP’s  for  union  and  non-union  members).  PSP’s  are  mostly  company-wide  with  only  12 
percent  of  firms  with  PSP’s  reporting  separate  plans  for  different  divisions  and  occupations. 
Moreover,  nearly  all  Japanese  PSP’s  are  cash  plans  (98  percent),  which  is  in  sharp  contrast  to 
the  U.S.  where  deferred  plans  are  more  popular  (see  Kruse  1993:  16- 17).  Being  almost 
always  cash  plans,  Japanese  PSP’s  have  no  tax  advantage.  Thus,  the  role  of  public  policy 
here  again  has  been  informal  and  educational,  consisting  largely  of  data  gathering,  information 
dissemination,  and  related  activities. 
The  majority  of  Japanese  PSP’s  (55  percent)  do  not  have  set  formula  for  how  the 
contribution  should  be  tied  to  profits,  which  is  also  in  contrast  to  PSP’s  in  the  U.S.  where 
only  22  percent  do  not  have  set  formula  (Kruse,  1993:  75).  Kruse  (1993)  reported  that  cash 
5The  figure  is  nearly  identical  to  that  reported  by 
General  Survey  of  Wages  and  Hours  Worked  System 
1985.  Chosa), 
a large  governmental  survey  called 
(Chingin  Rodoiikan  Seido  to  Sogo 
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plans  without  a  set  formula  were  the  most  effective  PSP’s  in  terms  of  their  productivity 
effects.  This  points  to  potentially  strong  positive  productivity  effects  for  Japanese  PSP’s. 
D.  Emplovee  Stock  Ownership  Plans  (ESOP’S)~ 
Japanese  ESOP’s  are  perhaps  best  understood  by  comparing  their  main  features  with 
the  better  known  U.S.  ESOP’s.  Unlike  U.S.  ESOP’s,  Japanese  corporations  establishing  an 
ESOP  (called  mochikabukai)  do  not  receive  any  tax  incentive  to  do  so.  To  induce  individual 
employees  to  participate  in  the  ESOP,  companies  offer  subsidies  (typically  the  firm  matching 
each  employee’s  contribution  by  giving  5 to  10 percent  of  the  contribution  as  well  as  bearing 
administrative  costs).  Whereas  ESOP’s  elsewhere  frequently  are  structured  so  as  to  encourage 
strong  participation  by  top  management,  in  Japan  executives  (as  well  as  part  time  and 
temporary  employees)  are  normally  ineligible  for  membership.  As  is  the  norm  elsewhere, 
individual  participants’  shares  (and  dividends)  in  the  ESOP  are  held  in  trust.  Unusually, 
however,  each  participant  has  a right  to  withdraw  his/her  shares,  and  share  withdrawals  are 
privately  owned.  Permission  to  withdraw  is  normally  subject  to  the  following  requirements: 
(i)  employees  must  keep  at  least  1,000  shares  in  the  trust;  and  (ii)  withdrawals  are  permitted 
only  in  1,000  shares,  round  lots.  It  takes  more  than  20  years  for  the  average  participant  to 
accumulate  2,000  shares  so  that  he/she  can  withdraw  1,000  shares  for  the  first  time  (Nomura 
Securities,  1990:  29).  While  members  may  freely  exit  completely  from  the  ESOP,  re-entry  is 
restricted.  Exiting  employees  will  receive  their  shares  in  1,000  shares,  round  lots,  and  must 
sell  the  remaining  shares  to  the  trust  at  the  prevailing  market  price.  Upon  retirement,  model 
6For  institutional  information  on  Japanese  ESOP’s,  I  draw  heavily  on  Jones  and  Kato 
(1993,  1995). 13 
rules  adopted  by  most  ESOP’s  require  retiring  workers  to  exit  completely  from  the  ESOP. 
Finally,  the  general  director  (ri_iicho) represents  stockholders  in  the  ESOP.  The  general 
director  is  chosen  by  other  participants,  on  a one-participant,  one-vote  basis.7  At  the  general 
meeting  of  shareholders,  the  general  director  votes  the  stock  held  by  the  plan,  deciding 
independently,  rather  than  by  tabulating  votes  of  employee  participants.  The  general  director 
must  be  a participant  in  the  ESOP  and  thus  is  not  an  executive. 
Our  survey  shows  that  ESOP’s  are  a relatively  new  and  the  most  rapidly  diffused 
innovation  among  various  Japanese  HRMP’s.  Thus,  in  1960  the  proportion  of  firms  that  had 
an  ESOP  was  only  4  percent.  The  proportion  grew  rapidly  during  the  next  decade,  reaching 
26  percent  by  1970.  In  1967,  a  special  government  committee  on  foreign  capital  advocated 
employee  ownership  as  a way  to  help  prevent  foreign  takeovers  of  domestic  firms.  The 
government,  using  informal  channels,  encouraged  firms  to  set  up  new  ESOP  trusts  to 
accommodate  employee  investments  in  their  stock.  While  the  fear  of  foreign  takeovers 
diminished  in  the  1970s  the  idea  of  employee  ownership  took  root.  Perhaps  partly  due  to 
this  government  initiative  of  1967,  the  1970s  were  characterized  by  an  astonishing  pace  of 
diffusion  of  the  institution,  and  the  proportion  of  firms  with  an  ESOP  grew  to  70  percent  by 
1980.  The  diffusion  continued  even  after  1980,  and  in  1993  it  became  a universal 
phenomenon  (97  percent  of  firms  reported  to  have  an  ESOP  in  that  year). 
Our  survey  also  shows  that  in  1993,  almost  50  percent  of  the  labor  force  in  firms  with 
71n practice  the  general  director  sometimes  assumes  the  directorship  without  formal 
election.  (Based  on  interviews  by  Kato  with  the  general  directors  and/or  middle  managers  in 
charge  of  employee  benefits  of  four  manufacturing  firms  in  Aichi  and  three  non-manufac- 
turing  firms  in  Tokyo,  summer  1991). 14 
ESOP’s  participated  in  ESOP’s8  Furthermore,  concerning  emnlovee  stakes,  Jones  and  Kato 
(1995)  report  that,  in  1988,  ESOP’s  owned  stock  worth  4.1  trillion  yen  (about  32  billion 
dollars);  this  amounts  to  1.7 million  yen  (about  14,000  dollars)  per  participant.  Since  the 
average  workers’  household  (households  whose  head  is  a non-executive  employee)  owned  net 
assets  of  6.164  million  yen  in  1988,9 this  means  that  the  average  stake  of  ESOP  participants 
in  1988  represents  about  30  percent  of  the  total  value  of  the  average  workers’  household’s  net 
assets. 
However,  according  to  Jones  and  Kato  (1995),  these  plans  do  not  own  large 
percentages  of  comuanv  stock.  For  listed  companies  the  proportion  of  stock  owned  by 
ESOP’s  has  varied  between  0.66  percent  and  1.42  percent.  In  1988  the  average  was  lower 
than  1 percent  and  holdings  over  5 percent  were  rare.  However,  while  the  total  percentage  of 
equity  owned  by  plans  is  small,  according  to  Nomura  Securities  (1990),  in  21  percent  of  all 
listed  Japanese  firms,  the  ESOP  is  one  of  the  ten  largest  shareholders.” 
‘Both  in  terms  of  the  incidence  of  the  plan  and  the  rate  of  participation  of  employees,  our 
survey  results  are  comparable  to  the  Survey  of  Stock  Distribution  (Kabushiki  Bunuu  Jvokvo 
Chosa),  conducted  annually  since  1973  by  the  National  Conference  Board  of  Securities 
Exchanges  (Zenkoku  Shoken  Torihiki_iyo  Kvogikai).  Since  &l  firms  listed  on  Japan’s  eight 
stock  exchange  markets  respond  to  the  survey  every  year,  the  survey  provides  the  most 
accurate  aggregate  picture  of  the  diffusion  of  Sops  among  firms  listed  on  Japanese  stock 
markets. 
‘This  figure  is  from  the  Familv  Saving  Survev  (Chochiku  Doko  Chosa),  conducted 
annually  by  the  Japanese  government’s  Management  and  Coordination  Agency,  Statistics 
Bureau. 
“In  addition,  the  importance  of  Sops  in  Japan  may  be  illustrated  by  some  comparisons 
with  employee  ownership  in  the  U.S.  Most  importantly,  in  the  U.S.,  there  is  on  average  a 
substantially  lower  incidence  of  plans,  especially  in  manufacturing  and  sectors  such  as 
transportation  and  construction.  (Compare,  for  example,  our  description  of  Japanese  Sops  with 
Joseph  R.  Blasi  and  Douglas  L.  Kruse,  1991:  Chapter  1). 
Second,  the  average  account  balance  in  a U.S.  ESOP  had  grown  to  $12,977  by  1987 
[U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  (U.S.  GAO),  1990:4].  As  such,  this  was  below  the  $14,000 
figure  for  Japanese  Sops.  However,  participants  in  U.S.  Sops  nearly  always  include 15 
II.  Productivitv  Effects  of  HRMP’s:  Hmotheses 
In  general,  formal  economic  theory  is  ambiguous  as  to  the  expected  effect  of 
participatory  HRMP’s  on  productivity.  (For  reviews,  see  the  essays  in  Blinder,  1990). 
Focusing  on  individual  motivation  and  performance,  however,  several  hypotheses  predict 
positive  productivity  effects,  of  which  the  following  two  (Goal  Alignment  Effects  and  Human 
Capital  Effects)  are  perhaps  most  important.  In  addition,  there  are  a number  of  hypotheses 
concerning  the  complementarities  and  substitutabilities  of  HRMP’s. 
executives  and  often  exclude  groups  of  non-executive  employees.  Since  the  average  stake 
strongly  linked  to  earnings,  it  is  almost  certainly  the  case  that  the  average  non-executive’s 
is 
ownership  stake  in  a U.S.  ESOP  will  be  substantially  below  that  for  participants  in  Japanese 
Sops,  where  executives  are  excluded. 
Third,  participation  rates  by  non-executive  employees  in  manufacturing  firms  that  have 
plans  seem  to  be  broadly  comparable  in  the  U.S.  Thus,  for  firms  quoted  on  U.S.  stock 
exchange  markets,  Blasi  and  Kruse  (1991)  assembled  data  for  firms  which  are  at  least  4 
percent  employee  held.  For  these  they  estimate  that  in  1988/89,  on  average  50  percent  of 
employees  were  participants  in  Sops.  But,  since  firms  that  were  at  least  4  percent  employee 
held  must  have  had  much  more  ESOP  activity  than  firms  with  Sops  as  a group,  the 
participation  rate  in  &l  firms  with  Sops  (rather  than  only  firms  with  “strong”  Sops)  must  have 
been  below  50  percent.  By  comparison,  for  all  manufacturing  firms  quoted  on  Japanese  stock 
exchanges  with  Sops  in  1988,  on  average,  46  percent  of  employees  were  participants  in  the 
ESOP  (Survey  of  Stock  Distribution). 
Fourth,  there  is  much  attrition  in  US.  Sops  and  recently  there  has  been  a dramatic 
increase  in  the  termination  rate  for  U.S.  plans  --  from  15 percent  between  1979-1985  to  30 
percent  between  1981-1987  (U.S.  GAO,  1990:8).  This  contrasts  sharply  with  the  situation  in 
Japan,  where  the  rate  of  termination  is  negligible. 
Last,  we  briefly  consider  the  implications  of  employee  ownership  for  employee 
influence  in  enterprise  governance.  Insofar  as  in  neither  case  do  Sops,  on  average,  own  large 
percentages  of  the  market  value  of  public  corporations,  the  situations  are  quite  similar.  Thus 
Blasi  and  IQ-use  (199 1: 12)  estimated  that  the  total  value  of  US  Sops  was  less  than  3 percent 
of  the  market  value  of  all  public  companies.  This  compares  with  a comparable  Japanese 
figure  of  0.85  percent  (Survey  of  Stock  Distribution).  However,  for  the  1000  U.S.  public 
corporations  with  Sops  in  which  employee  ownership  is  strongest,  the  median  ownership  is 
estimated  to  be  almost  10 percent  (Blasi  and  Kruse,  1991: 12).  But  even  for  these  top  1000 
U.S.  Sops,  non-managerial  employee  involvement  and  influence  via  Sops  was  typically 
modest.  Thus  it  is  estimated  that  fewer  than  10 firms  have  non-managerial  employees 
representing  employee  shareholders  by  serving  on  the  board,  and  that  only  5 percent  are 
judged  to  have  a  “participatory”  culture  (Blasi  and  Kruse,  1991:216-230). 16 
A.  Goal  Alignment  Effects  of  HRMP’s 
Consider  ESOP’s  first  as  they  are  the  easiest  example  by  which  one  can  understand 
how  the  goal  alignment  effects  arise.  The  most  direct  positive  effects  of  ESOP’s  result  from 
enterprise  success  being  reflected  in  a higher  price  of  its  equity,  and  thus  higher  wealth  for 
employees  who  own  stock  in  the  ESOP.  In  such  cases,  the  interest  of  the  firm  is  more 
aligned  with  the  interest  of  its  employees.  For  several  reasons,  these  interest  alignment 
effects  of  ESOP’s  can  be  expected  to  be  more  significant  in  Japan  than  in  the  U.S.  Thus, 
while  ESOP’s  in  the  U.S.  often  are  structured  to  encourage  strong  participation  by  top  manag- 
ement,  normally  executives  are  ineligible  for  membership  in  Japanese  ESOP’s  (Jones  and 
Kato,  1995).  U.S.  ESOP’s  frequently  are  designed  to  prevent  participation  by  groups  of  non- 
executive  employees,  especially  union  members  (Blasi,  1988).  But  in  Japan  typically  all  full- 
time  non-executive  employees  are  eligible  for  membership  and,  based  on  our  interviews  with 
managers  of  several  Japanese  manufacturing  corporations,  it  appears  that  blue-collar  workers 
actively  participate  in  ESOP’s.  Moreover,  the  average  ESOP  participant  owns  a  substantial 
amount  of  stock,  worth  14,000  dollars  on  average.  An  almost  identical  argument  can  be 
developed  for  PSP’s. 
The  goal  alignment  effects  of  information  sharing  via  JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s  are  more 
subtle  (but  not  necessarily  weaker).  First,  information  sharing  is  expected  to  reduce 
information  asymmetry  between  labor  and  management  and,  consequently,  avoid  the 
development  of  adversarial  labor-management  relations.  In  labor-management  relations, 
employers  are  said  to  have  more  information  about  the  status  of  the  firm  and  business 
strategies.  Workers,  under  usual  collective  bargaining  arrangements,  have  no  means  of 
obtaining  such  information  except  to  resort  to  hard  bargaining  often  coupled  with  the  threat  of 17 
strikes  (Tracy,  1986).  Such  behavior  on  the  part  of  the  unions  and  employees  may  lead  to 
adversarial  labor  relations,  which  may,  in  turn,  have  negative  consequences  for  productivity. 
Voluntary  information  sharing  by  management,  via  such  mechanism  as  JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s, 
is  likely  to  reduce  the  cost  of  such  information  asymmetry  and  is  likely  to  have  positive 
effects  on  productivity.  Second,  employers  may  be  voluntarily  share  information  to  enhance 
worker  loyalty,  and  all  else  equal,  reduce  turnover  (Kleiner  and  Bouillon,  1991).  Worker 
cooperation  may  also  be  obtained  through  higher  workers  commitment  and  loyalty.  Enhanced 
worker  loyalty,  reduced  turnover  and  cooperative  behavior  are  all  predicted  to  have  positive 
effects  on  productivity.  In  economic  terms,  sharing  information  on  private  information  which 
has  been  heretofore  restricted  to  owners  and  top  management  is  likely  to  lead  to  goal 
alignment  and  trust  between  labor  and  management.  Better  informed  via  JLMC’s  and 
NUEA’s,  workers,  while  still  striving  for  their  own  benefit,  may  be  more  likely  to  be 
convinced  that  it  is  in  their  interest  to  cooperate  with  management  and  improve  productivity 
and  firm  performance.  They  may  see  more  clearly  the  path  from  their  own  behavior  to 
enlargement  of  the  benefits  through  firm  prosperity.  Also,  information  sharing  is  likely  to 
curtail  management’s  opportunistic  behavior  and  increase  the  level  of  trust  that  labor  has  for 
management.  In  a repeated  game  situation  where  the  interdependence  between  labor  and 
management  is  likely  to  continue  in  the  future,  provision  of  private,  business  information  is 
likely  to  enable  labor  to  detect  management’s  deception  and  curtail  opportunistic  behavior. 
Moreover,  labor  is  more  likely  to  develop  trust  in  management  that  voluntarily  shares 
information.  Overall,  by  avoiding  the  negative  consequences  of  management’s  moral  hazard 
and  increasing  the  positive  effects  of  labor’s  cooperative  behavior,  information  sharing  is 
likely  to  have  favorable  effects  on  productivity.  These  effects  are  even  more  likely  to  be 18 
enhanced  when  JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s  go  beyond  simple  information  sharing,  by  allowing 
employee  to  participate  (to  varying  degrees)  in joint  decision  making.  As  indicated  earlier, 
JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s  often  act  as  mechanisms  for  employee  consultation  and  joint  decision 
making.  In  these  cases,  the  positive  productivity  effects  are  predicted  to  be  even  more 
pronounced. 
B.  Human  Capital  Effects  of  HRMP’s 
JLMC’s  and  NUEA’s  may  play  an  important  role  of  providing  employees  a  voice  in 
the  firm  and  thus  reduce  the  costs  of  exit  from  the  firm,  saving  specific  human  capital.”  In 
the  absence  of  unions,  these  arrangements  may  provide  the  sole  voice  mechanism,  while  in 
the  presence  of  unions  they  may  supplement  the  direct  voice  mechanism  of  unions.  Also,  in 
order  to  own  shares  privately,  the  average  employee  participant  in  a Japanese  ESOP  must  stay 
with  the  firm  for  a significant  number  of  years  (Jones  and  Kato,  1995).  This  vesting  feature 
would  be  expected  to  discourage  employee  turnover  and  promote  the  formation  of  more  firm- 
specific  human  capital. 
C.  Complementarv  Effects  of  HRMP’s 
Information  sharing  and  financial  participation  are  likely  to  have  complementary 
effects  on  productivity  through  goal  alignment  processes,  with  financial  participation  directly 
aligning  employees’  and  management’s  goals,  and  information  sharing  indirectly  aligning  two 
parties’  goals  by  modifying  employee  perceptions  and  expectations  regarding  management’s 
behavior.  Three  specific  mechanisms  may  be  proposed.  First,  as  Levine  and  Tyson  (1990: 
“In  the  context  of  trade  unions,  the  argument  was  first  developed  by  Freeman  (1976). 19 
209)  argue  that  successful  information  sharing  will  require  financial  participation  schemes  that 
assure  financial  rewards  for  continued  participation  in  information  sharing  by  employees. 
Information  sharing,  which  induces  employees’  cooperative  behavior  is  not  likely  to  be 
effective  over  a  long  haul  in  the  absence  of  tangible  rewards,  since  employees  may  lose 
interest  in  being  cooperative  and  reduce  their  loyalty.  Second,  financial  participation  may 
also  require  information  sharing  to  be  effective,  in  part,  due  to  the  role  which  information 
sharing  plays  in  reducing  management’s  moral  hazard.  One  of  the  important  preconditions  of 
a  successful  financial  participation  scheme  is  that  employees  need  to  trust  that  management  is 
honest  in  reporting  the  status  of  the  firm  to  both  employees  and  outside  markets.  Voluntary 
information  sharing,  often  involving  private  information  not  yet  available  to  the  outside 
investors,  allows  employees  to  monitor  employer  behavior  more  effectively.  Management, 
which  voluntarily  shares  financial  and  other  business  information  knowing  that  such 
information  may  be  used  to  discipline  their  own  behavior,  is  also  not  likely  to  engage  in 
deceptive  and  opportunistic  behavior  in  financial  participation  schemes.  Third,  Weitzman  and 
G-use,  1990:  100)  argue  that  profit  sharing  works  only  when  the  free  rider  problem  is 
effectively  eased.  Arguably  the  free  rider  problem  will  be  alleviated  when  workers  develop  a 
strong  long-term  commitment  to  the  company,  so  that  workers  face  a repeated  game,  and/or 
when  workers  engage  in  active  peer  monitoring.  As  discussed  above,  information  sharing  can 
be  thought  of  a mechanism  to  facilitate  the  development  of  a long-term  commitment  to  the 
firm  by  its  workers. 
D.  Unions  and  HRMP’s 
The  conventional  wisdom  is  that  unions  will  be  expected  to  reduce  the  effectiveness  of 20 
HRMP’s.  This  follows  from  diverse  reasons  --for  example  limited  cooperation  in  general 
between  a union  and  a body  such  a JLMC.  However,  in  some  circumstances,  unions  can  be  a 
complement  to  HRMP’s.  For  instance,  when  unions  are  allowed  to  select  labor 
representatives  to  corporate  JLMC’s,  employees’  skepticism  about  JLMC’s  can  be  reduced  and 
their  full  participation  can  be  encouraged.  Moreover,  unions  can  increase  the  effectiveness  of 
information  sharing  by  facilitating  the  dissemination  of  information  shared  during  the 
corporate  JLMC’s  meetings  to  the  rank  and  file  via  formal  and  informal  union  meetings  and 
newsletters. 
Whole-hearted  participation  in  information  sharing  is  sometimes  hampered  by 
employee  participants’  fear  that  their  suggestions  to  enhance  productivity  may  result  in  the 
elimination  of  their  jobs.  Again,  the  presence  of  unions,  who  fight  for  the  protection  of  jobs, 
can  ease  this  kind  of  fear  and  thus  encourage  more  whole-hearted  participation  of  employees. 
Furthermore,  unions  complement  JLMC’s  by  providing  assurance  and  support  to  the 
voluntary  nature  of  JLMC’s.  As  noted  earlier,  JLMC’s  have  no  legal  foundation  in  the 
Japanese  labor  their  existence  or  functions,  in  contrast  to  labor  unions  which  are  grounded  in 
the  Japanese  collective  bargaining  system.  Thus,  those  JLMC’s  existing  without  union 
representation  may  be  weaker  due  to  the  fact  that  the  existence  and  strength  of  information 
sharing  and  consultation  functions  are  entirely  up  to  management’s  whim.  They  may  be  taken 
away  any  moment  and  labor’s  efforts  to  increase  the  level  of  participation  through  JLMC’s 
may  lack  an  effective  power  base.  In  contrast,  when  unions  are  present,  they  may  provide 
further  negotiating  power  to  the  labor  side  in  maintaining  or  even  increasing  the  strength  of 
information  sharing  and  consultation  through  JLMC’s. 21 
III.  Basic  EmDirical  Strategv  and  the  Data 
In  estimating  the  impact  of  JLMC’s,  NUEA’s,  PSP’s  and  ESOP’s  on  productive 
efficiency,  our  basic  empirical  strategy  is  to  use  a production  function  framework.12  Spe- 
cifically  we  estimate  equations  of  the  general  form: 
(1)  Q  =  W-L  L  H,  Z> 
where  Q  denotes  a measure  of  output,  K  and  L  are  a measure  of  total  capital  stock  and  total 
employment;  H  is  a vector  of  variables  representing  the  effects  of  JLMC’s,  NUEA’s,  PSP’s 
and  ESOP’s  on  productivity;  and  Z  is  a  vector  of  control  variables  such  as  managerial  ability. 
We  estimate  various  specifications  of  Eq.  (1)  by  using  an  important  new  sixteen  year 
panel  containing  65  firms  over  the  1970-1985  (accounting  year)  period.  All  observations  are 
for  manufacturing  firms  listed  in  Japan’s  three  major  stock  exchanges,  Tokyo,  Osaka  and 
Nagoya.  This  panel  data  set  was  assembled  by  merging  three  data  bases.  The  data  on 
JLMC’s,  NUEA’s,  PSP’s  and  ESOP’s  were  from  our  HRM  Survey  of  Japanese  Firms.  The 
data  on  K  and  L  were  compiled  from  the  Nikkei  financial  data  tapes,  Nikkei  Needs.  The  data 
on  value  added  as  a proxy  for  Q  were  published  in  various  special  Data  Bank  issues  of 
Weeklv  Oriental  Economist  (Weeklv  TovokeizaiZ  during  1974-1987  by  the  Oriental 
Economist  (Tovokeizai  Shinno  Sha).  There  were  65  manufacturing  firms  for  which  we  have 
complete  information  on  Q,  K,  L,  H  for  each  year  from  1970  through  1985.  In  converting 
nominal  variables  into  real  variables,  we  used  the  Wholesale  Price  Indices  (WPI)  published  by 
120ur  framework  is  similar  to  the  one  adopted  by  recent  studies  on  the  productivity  effect 
of  profit  sharing  in  the  U.S.  and  U.K.  See,  for  instance,  John  R.  Cable  and  Nicholas  Wilson 
(1989,  1990),  Sushi1  Wadhwani  and  Martin  Wall  (1990)  and  Kruse  (1992). 22 
the  Bank  of  Japan  to  deflate  all  nominal  variablesI 
IV.  Suecifications  and  Results 
We  begin  with  the  translog  specification  without  interaction  terms: 
(2)  lnQ,,  =  &lnKi,  +  PLlnLit +  Pkk(lnKi,)2  +  PLL(lnLi,)2  +  &(lnK,,*lnL,,)  +  P&AGE, 
+  P,NUAGEi,  +  P,PSAGE,,  +  P,ESAGE,,  +  &,(JLAGE,,)~  +  P,,(NUAGE$ 
+  Ppp(PSAGEi,)*  +  PEE(ESAGEd2  +  PJJJ(JLAGEit)3 +  PNNN(NUAGEi,)3 
+  pppp(PSAGEi,)3  +  PEEE(ESAGEi~)3  +  a,  + 2, +  Ui, 
where  Qit is  output  of  firm  i in  year  t;  Ki, is  the  capital  stock;  Li, is  labor;  JLAGE,,  is  the  age 
of  a JLMC;  NUAGE,  is  the  age  of  an  NUEA;  PSAGE,,  is  the  age  of  a PSP;  ESAGE,,  is  the 
age  of  an  ESOP;  a,  is  firm  specific  fixed  effects;  z, is  year  effects;  and  ps  are  slope  coef- 
ficients.  For  the  disturbance  term,  uit, we  assume  uit _  NID(0,  02). 
Table  1 provides  summary  statistics  of  all  variables  to  be  used  in  the  subsequent 
analysis.  Output  is  measured  by  value  added  deflated  by  the  WPI  for  manufacturing  products 
at  the  2-digit  industry  level  (published  by  the  Bank  of  Japan)  for  each  accounting  year.  The 
capital  stock  is  proxied  by  the  fixed  assets  of  the  firm  deflated  by  the  WPI  for  capital  goods 
(published  by  the  Bank  of  Japan).  Labor  is  measured  by  the  number  of  workers  (executives 
and  temporary  workers  excluded). 
131t  does  not  appear  that  our  sample  is  biased  towards  firms  with  progressive  human 
resource  management.  As  we  discussed  before,  the  proportion  of  firms  with  each  HRMP  in 
our  sample  is  quite  similar  to  the  one  derived  from  other,  often  larger  governmental  surveys. 
The  only  exception  is  NUEA’s,  i.e.,  our  sample  shows  53%  and  is  lower  than  what  Sato 
(1994)  reports.  However,  as  we  discussed,  this  is  attributable  to  the  prevalence  of  small  firms 
in  his  sample. 23 
We  use  the  age  of  each  HRMP  to  capture  its  productivity  effectsI  For  instance,  the 
marginal  productivity  gains  from  a JLMC  is  defined  as  MPG,  =  &nQ/aJLAGE.  The 
percentage  change  in  Q  as  a result  of  an  additional  year  of  the  JLMC  is  approximated  by 
(eMPGj  _ l)*lOO.  To  allow  the  MPG  to  change  over  time,  moreover,  we  introduce  the  age  of 
each  HRMP  in  a cubic  form.  Thus, 
(3)  MPG,  =  PI + 2P,,JLAGE  +  3&,,JLAGE2 
p,  measures  the  marginal  productivity  gains  from  a JLMC  at  the  time  of  its  introduction.  One 
may  argue  that  the  MPG  from  a JLMC  may  be  small  to  begin  with  because  workers  may  not 
commit  fully  to  this  new  practice  initially.  As  time  goes  by,  the  commitment  of  workers  to 
this  practice  will  increase  and  so  will  the  MPG.  However,  the  law  of  diminishing  returns  will 
eventually  set  in  and  thus  the  MPG  will  diminish.  The  practice  will  finally  lose  its  power  and 
will  require  a new  innovation.  This  hypothesis  on  the  life  cycle  of  a JLMC  will  be  supported 
if  the  estimates  on  p,r and  &,,  are  positive  and  negative.  Moreover,  the  critical  age  of  the 
practice  at  which  the  law  of  diminishing  returns  will  set  in  can  be  given  by  P,,/3PIJI. 
We  include  year  dummy  variables  (2,) to  capture  technological  change  and  other 
shocks  that  are  common  to  all  firms.  Firm  specific  fixed  effects  (ai)  capture  the  time-in- 
variant  heterogeneity  of  our  firms.  In  particular,  firm  specific  fixed  effects  will  attempt  to 
control  for  differences  among  firms  in  managerial  abilities  and  worker  quality.  As  Wadhwani 
and  Wall  (1990)  argue  in  the  case  of  profit  sharing,  an  innovative  HRMP  might  be  adopted  in 
firms  that  are  better  managed.  If  so,  the  coefficients  on  HRMP  variables  might  indicate  the 
effects  of  superior  managers  as  well  as  the  actual  effects  of  HRMP’s.  If  managerial 
differences  across  firms  are  largely  time-invariant,  firm  specific  fixed  effects  will  help 
14A similar  approach  is  taken  by  Kumbhakar  and  Dunbar  (1993). 24 
separate  the  two  effects.  Moreover,  as  Michael  A.  Conte  and  Jan  Svejnar  (1990)  argue  in  the 
case  of  ESOP’s,  firms  with  innovative  HRMP’s  might  have  more  productive  and  more 
qualified  workers  than  do  conventional  firms.  To  the  extent  that  they  are  time-invariant,  firm 
specific  fixed  effects  will  also  capture  these  quality  differences.15 
Table  2  reports  the  OLS  estimates  of  Eq.  (2).  To  see  whether  the  translog  production 
functions  are  well  behaved,  we  calculated  the  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  capital  and 
labor.  Always  we  find  positive  elasticities.16  The  coefficient  on  PSAGE3  is  clearly  not 
significantly  different  from  zero  even  at  the  10%  level,  suggesting  that  the  MPG  from  PSP’s 
is  linear  instead  of  quadratic.  We  reestimated  Eq.  (2),  assuming  that  the  MPG  from  PSP’s  is 
linear.  The  estimated  coefficients  on  JLAGE,  PSAGE,  ESAGE  are  positive  and  significant  at 
the  2%  level  and  the  estimated  coefficient  on  NUAGE  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  10% 
level.  These  estimated  coefficients  suggest  that  the  introduction  of  a JLMC  will  boost  annual 
productivity  by  9%  over  the  first  year.  Likewise,  the  introduction  of  an  NUEA,  a PSP,  and 
an  ESOP  will  enhance  annual  productivity  by  2%,  6%,  and  2%  over  the  first  year.  These 
productivity  gains  will  however  change  over  time.  Figure  1 was  drawn  using  the  estimated 
coefficients  on  JLAGE,  JLAGE*,  JLAGE3;  which  are  all  significant  at  the  2%  level.  As  the 
figure  shows,  the  MPG  will  initially  rise  as  the  JLMC  ages.  At  age  23,  the  JLMC  will  reach 
its  peak  performance  or  almost  a  11 percent  increase  in  annual  productivity  as  a result  of 
having  the  JLMC  one  more  year.  Then  the  JLMC  will  begin  to  lose  its  efficacy  gradually. 
We  interpret  this  life  cycle  pattern  of  JLMC’s  as  follows.  Workers  are  initially  not  entirely 
15A similar  argument  is  made  for  the  case  of  profit  sharing  by  Masao  Nakamura  and  Alice 
Nakamura  (1989)  and  Ronald  G.  Ehrenberg  (1990). 
16We also  estimated  the  Cobb-Douglas  specifications.  F  tests  indicate  that  the  translog  is 
the  preferred  specification. 25 
committed  to  this  new  management  initiative.  However,  as  time  goes  by,  the  workers’ 
commitment  will  increase.  At  the  same  time,  both  management  and  labor  will  refine  the 
JLMC  based  on  learning  by  doing.  As  a result,  the  efficacy  of  JLMC’s  will  rise  as  they  age. 
However,  after  23  years,  there  will  not  be  much  room  for  learning  by  doing  and  the 
enthusiasm  amongst  managers  and  workers  will  also  fade  away. 
Figure  2  was  drawn  likewise  and  indicate  the  opposite  dynamic  pattern  for  ESOP’s.  as 
Figure  2  shows,  the  MPG  from  ESOP’s  will  decline  from  2%  to  zero  during  the  first  16 years, 
and  will  bounce  back  after.  The  estimated  coefficients  on  ESAGE,  ESAGE*,  and  ESAGE3 
are  all  significant  at  the  5%  level.17  As  described  above,  the  typical  worker  will  need  to  wait 
for  20  years  till  he  can  actually  withdraw  his  share  to 
to  argue  that  the  strong  goal  alignment  effects  as  well 
are  truly  felt  only  after  many  years,  say  16 years. 
realize  capital  gains.  One  may  be  able 
as  the  human  capital  effects  of  ESOP’s 
As  discussed  before,  the  MPG  from  PSP’s  is  found  to  be  monotonically  diminishing 
from  6%,  suggesting  that  the  law  of  diminishing  returns  appears  to  set  in  even  at  earlier 
stages  of  the  plan. 
We  now  consider  the  interactions  amongst  these  HRMP’s.  To  this  end,  we  add  to  Eq. 
(2),  the  following  six  interaction  terms:  JLAGE*NUAGE;  JLAGE*PSAGE;  JLAGE*ESAGE; 
NUAGE*PSAGE;  NUAGE*ESAGE;  and  PSAGE*ESAGE.  The  coefficients  on  the 
interaction  terms  will  indicate  the  complementarities  and  substitutabilities  of  these  four 
HRMP’s.  In  Table  3  we  report  OLS  estimates  of  Eq.  (2)  augmented  by  these  interaction 
terms.  With  regard  to  the  interactions  between  information  sharing  and  financial  participation, 
170ne  can  draw  a  similar  graph  for  NUEA’s.  However,  since  the  coefficients  on  NUAGE, 
NUAGE2,  and  NUAGE3  are  not  all  precisely  estimated,  one  has  to  interpret  the  graph  with 
much  caution. 26 
the  estimated  coefficients  on  NUAGE*PSAGE  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  5%  level, 
confirming  our  prior  that  information  sharing  and  financial  participation  by  PSP’s  are  indeed 
complementary.  However,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  JLAGE*ESAGE  and 
NUAGE*ESAGE  are  negative  and  significant  at  the  2%  level,  pointing  to  the  substitutabilities 
between  information  sharing  and  ESOP’s.  We  are  not  totally  sure  of  this  anomaly.  One 
possibility  is  that  while  information  sharing  may  solicit  workers’  cooperation  as  employees  of 
the  firm,  ESOP’s  may  induce  their  sense  of  “ownership”  of  the  firm,  thus  directing  their 
attention  to  the  total  value  of  the  firm  as  reflected  in  the  stock  value.  Since  the  total  value  of 
the  firm  (at  least  in  the  short  run)  may  be  not  attained  only  through  employees’  cooperative 
behavior  only,  but  may  be  attained  through  such  actions  as  layoff  and  downsizing,  the 
existence  of  both  ESOP’s  and  information  sharing  may  create  conflicting  motives  in 
employees.  While  ESOP’s  create  a  sense  of  ownership  and  interests  in  the  total  value  of  the 
firm,  information  sharing  may  be  conducive  in  creating  a  sense  of  loyalty  as  employees  of  the 
firm  and  interest  in  the  long-term  survival  and  growth  of  the  firm. 
Finally,  we  consider  the  issue  of  trade  unions.  First,  one  may  argue  that  the  observed 
productivity  effects  of  these  HRMP’s  are  capturing  the  alleged  productivity  effects  of  unions.18 
The  estimates  reported  in  Tables  4A  and  4B  indicate  whether  and  how  much  the  results  of 
Tables  2  and  3 change  when  we  add  UNAGE  (age  of  unions)  and  UNAGE*  and  UNAGE3  to 
control  for  the  alleged  productivity  effects  of  unions  (we  add  UNAGE  only  and  then  later  add 
18Very few  attempts  have  been  made  to  investigate  the  effects  on  firm  performance  of 
Japanese  unions.  Muramatsu  (1983)  used  aggregate  data  grouped  by  industry  and  firm  size  to 
estimate  production  functions  augmented  by  union  density,  and  found  significant  positive 
effects  on  productivity  of  unions.  However,  Brunello  (1992)  recently  used  firm-level  micro 
data  to  correct  for  aggregation  bias  and  obtained  the  opposite  result,  i.e.,  that  Japanese  unions 
reduce  productivity. 27 
it  in  cubic  form).  It  turned  out  that  the  introduction  of  unions  does  not  change  none  of  our 
key  findings. 
Second,  to  see  if  there  is  any  interaction  between  HRMP’s  and  unions,  we  add  four 
interaction  terms:  UNAGE*JLAGE;  UNAGE*NUAGE;  UNAGE*PSAGE;  and 
UNAGE*ESAGE  to  Eq.  (2).  The  coefficients  on  the  interaction  terms  will  indicate  the 
complementarities  and  substitutabilities  of  HRMP’s  and  unions.  In  Table  5  we  report  OLS 
estimates  of  Eq.  (2)  augmented  by  these  interaction  terms.  With  regard  to  the  interactions 
between  information  sharing  and  unions,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  UNAGE*JLAGE  are 
positive  and  significant  at  the  1%  level  whether  UNAGE  is  introduced  in  linear  form  or  in 
cubic  form,  indicating  that  information  sharing  via  JLMC’s  and  unions  are  complementary. 
Concerning  the  interactions  between  financial  participation  and  unions,  the  coefficient  on 
UNAGE*ESAGE  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  1% level  when  UNAGE  is  introduced  in 
linear  form,  pointing  to  the  substitutabilities  between  ESOP’s  and  unions.  However,  the 
substitutabilities  between  ESOP’s  and  unions  are  not  particularly  robust  because  the 
coefficient  on  UNAGE*ESAGE  is  no  longer  significant  even  at  the  10%  level  when  UNAGE 
is  introduced  in  cubic  form. 
V.  Conclusions 
We  report  the  first  results  for  Japanese  firms  on  the  effects  of  four  important  HRMP’s 
by  estimating  production  functions  using  a unique  new  panel  data  set  containing  firms  with 
varying  ages  of  HRMP’s.  We  find  significant  productivity-enhancing  effects  for  all  four 
HRMP’s.  We  further  find  that  these  productivity  gains  will  change  as  these  HRMP’s  age. 
For  instance,  the  introduction  of  a JLMC  boosts  productivity  initially  by  9%  annually.  The 28 
productivity  gains  will  then  rise  as  time  goes  by  and  will  reach  their  highest  (11%)  23  years 
after  the  introduction  of  the  JLMC.  After  that  the  productivity  gains  will  gradually  diminish 
and  eventually  call  for  a  new  innovation  in  information  sharing. 
With  regard  to  the  interactions  amongst  these  HRMP’s,  we  find  a  significant 
complementarity  between  NUEA’s  and  PSP’s.  However,  we  also  find  that  ESOP’s  and 
information  sharing  either  via  JLMC’s  or  via  NUEA’s  are  substitutes. 
Finally,  we  explore  the  link  between  these  HRMP’s  and  trade  unions.  We  confirm  that 
the  key  findings  concerning  the  productivity  effects  of  these  four  HRMP’s  do  not  change 
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cubic  form,  indicating  that  information  sharing  via  JLMC’s  and  unions  are  complementary. 
Concerning  the  interactions  between  financial  participation  and  unions,  the  coefficient  on 
UNAGE*ESAGE  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  1% level  when  UNAGE  is  introduced  in 
linear  form,  pointing  to  the  substitutabilities  between  ESOP’s  and  unions.  However,  the 
substitutabilities  between  ESOP’s  and  unions  are  not  particularly  robust  because  the 
coefficient  on  UNAGE*ESAGE  is  no  longer  significant  even  at  the  10%  level  when  UNAGE 
is  introduced  in  cubic  form. 
V.  Conclusions 
We  report  the  first  results  for  Japanese  firms  on  the  effects  of  four  important  HRMP’s 
by  estimating  production  functions  using  a unique  new  panel  data  set  containing  firms  with 
varying  ages  of  HRMP’s.  We  find  significant  productivity-enhancing  effects  for  all  four 
HRMP’s.  We  further  find  that  these  productivity  gains  will  change  as  these  HRMP’s  age. 
For  instance,  the  introduction  of  a JLMC  boosts  productivity  initially  by  9%  annually.  The 29 
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Variable  Description  Means  (Standard  Deviation) 
Q  Value  added  in  1970  yen  30.1 18*106  (67.567*106) 
K  Capital  stock  in  1970  yen  22.844*106  (32.025*106) 
L  Employment  6.1594*103  (10.864*103) 
JLAGE  Age  of  Joint  Labor  22.598  (11.676) 
Management  Committees 
(JLMCs) 
NUAGE  Age  of  Non-Union  7.4058  (11.685) 
Employee  Associations 
(NUEA) 
PSAGE  Age  of  Profit  Sharing  (PS)  0.81731  (3.9383) 
plans 
ESAGE  Age  of  Employee  Stock  6.6779  (6.8835) 
Ownership  Plans  (ESOPs) 
UNAGE  Age  of  trade  unions  26.688  (10.669) 
Observations  1040 
Number  of  65 
firms 
Time  period  1970-1985 
Sources:  Human  Resource  Management  Survev  of  Japanese  Firms,  Nikkei  NEEDS,  and  Weekly 
Oriental  Economist. Table  2  __  OLS  Estimates  of  Translog  Production  Function, 
Augmented  By  Human  Resource  Management  Practices  (Dependent  Variable  =  InQ) 
Variable  I  (9  I  (ii) 
1nK  1.9833  (2.485)  I .9705  (2.490) 
-4.1091  (6.355)  1 -4.1024  (6.369) 
(1nK)’  I  -0.883 1 lE-01  (4.030)  -0.87992E-01  (4.044) 
(1nL)’  I  -0.14603  (4.372)  I  -0.14597  (4.373) 
(lnK)*(lnL)  I  0.29756  (7.188)  I  0.29724  (7.197) 
0.87234E-01  (7.395)  0.86951E-01  (7.510) 
NUAGE  1 O.l9696E-01  (1.867)  O.l9758E-01  (1.876) 
PSAGE 
ESAGE 
0.57897E-01  (2.960)  0.56096E-01  (4.159) 
0.22984E-01  (2.479)  0.23207E-01  (2.550) 
JLAGE’  0.77064E-03  (2.372)  0.78086E-03  (2.48 1) 
NUAGE2 
PSAGE2 
-O.l0330E-02  (1.690)  -O.l0321E-02  (1.690) 
-0.2 1529E-02  (1.085)  -0,19052E-02  (4.939) 
ESAGE2  -O.l4609E-02  (2.253)  -O.l4683E-02  (2.274) 
JLAGE3  -O.l1099E-04  (2.517)  -O.l1226E-04  (2.615) 
NUAGE3  O.l6574E-04  (1.563)  O.l6522E-04  (1.560) 
PSAGE3  0.59376E-05  (0.127) 
ESAGE3  0.30011 E-04  (2.232)  1 0.30139E-04  (2.249) 
Observations  1040  1040 
Number  of  firms  65  65 
Time  period  1970-1985  1970-1985 
R-squared  0.962549  1  0.9625484 
Notes:  Absolute  values  of  t statistics  are  in  parentheses.  All  models  include  time  dummies  and 
firm  specific  fixed  effects. 
Sources:  Human  Resource  Management  Survey  of  Japanese  Firms,  Nikkei  NEEDS,  and  Weekly 
Oriental  Economist. Table  3  -  OLS  Estimates  of  Translog  Production  Function,  Human  Resource 
Management  Practices  Interacted  with  Each  Other  (Dependent  Variable  =  1nQ) 
Variable  (ii) 
1nK  I  1.9057  (2.421) 
1 -3.8175  (5.988) 
(lnK)2  1 -0.83419E-01  (3.864) 
(lnL)2  1 -0.14343  (4.372) 
(lnK)*(lnL)  I  0.28284  (6.9 15) 
JLAGE  0.74375E-0  1 (6.152) 






ESAGE2  O.l1310E-03  (0.166) 
JLAGE3  -0.79824E-05  (1.802) 
0.69142E-01  (2.247) 
0.76751E-01  (6.077) 
O.l5063E-02  (4.325) 
-0.66867E-03  (1.054) 
-0.54709E-03  (0.78 1) 
NUAGE3  O.l0256E-04  (0.976) 
ESAGE3  0.2296  1  E-04  (I  .679) 
JLAGE*NUAGE  O.l5569E-03  (0.436) 
JLAGE*PSAGE  -0.1981  lE-02  (1.291) 
JLAGE*ESAGE  -0.22969E-02  (5.642) 
NUAGE*PSAGE  O.l5322E-02  (2.148) 
NUAGE*ESAGE  -0.69980E-03  (2.48 1) 
PSAGE*ESAGE  0.94679E-03  (0.602) 
Observations  1040 
Number  of  firms  65 
Time  period  1970-1985 
R-squared  0.9644948 
Notes:  Absolute  values  of  t statistics  are  in  parentheses.  All  models  include  time  dummies  and 
firm  specific  fixed  effects. 
Sources:  Human  Resource  Management  Survev  of Jauanese  Firms,  Nikkei  NEEDS,  and  Weekly 
Oriental  Economist. Table  4A  -  OLS  Estimates  of  Translog  Production  Function,  Augmented  By  Human 
Resource  Management  Practices,  Unions  Considered  (Dependent  Variable  =  1nQ) 
Variable  I  (9  I  (ii)  II 
1nK  2.0283  (2.559)  I  2.2012  (2.778)  II 
1nL  -4.1075  (6.378)  -4.133 1 (6.450) 
(lnK)*  -0.89351E-01  (4.102)  -0.92765E-01  (4.275) 
(lnL)*  -0.14683  (4.399)  -0.14239  (4.198) 
(lnK)*(lnL)  0.29776  (7.2 11)  0.29588  (7.148) 
JLAGE  0.86372E-01  (7.455)  0.7 1294E-01  (5.565)  II 
NUAGE  I  0.20099E-0  1 (1.908)  O.l6842E-01  (1.596)  II 
PSAGE  0.57483E-01  (4.247)  0.51961E-01  (3.83 1)  II 






0.79672E-03  (2.530)  0.20323E-02  (3.836) 
-O.l0635E-02  (1.740)  -0.9 1524E-03  (1.493) 
-O.l9440E-02  (5.023)  -O.l7252E-02  (4.414) 
-O.l5019E-02  (2.325)  -O.l2253E-02  (1.888) 
-O.l1405E-04  (2.655)  -0.29590E-04  (3.545) 
NUAGE3  O.l7007E-04  ( 1.605)  O.l5433E-04  (1.454)  II 





0.11758  (1.203)  0.25469  (2.421) 
-O.l8727E-02  (3.028) 
0.24935E-04  (2.656) 
1040  1040 
Number  of  firms  1 65  1 65 
I  I  I 
Time  period  1970-1985  1970-1985 
R-squared  0.9626058  0.9630634 
Notes:  Absolute  values  of  t statistics  are  in  parentheses.  All  models  include  time  dummies  and 
firm  specific  fixed  effects. 
Sources:  Human  Resource  Management  Survev  of  Japanese  Firms,  Nikkei  NEEDS,  and  Weekly 
Oriental  Economist. Table  4B  -  OLS  Estimates  of  Translog  Production  Function,  Augmented  By  Human 
Resource  Management  Practices,  Unions  Considered  (Dependent  Variable  =  1nQ) 
Variable  I  (9  I  (ii) 
1nK  1.9496  (2.473)  2.1188  (2.679) 
1nL  -3.8263  (6.001)  -3.8268  (6.013) 
( lnK)2  -0.84525E-01  (3.910)  -0.87097E-01  (4.032) 
(lnL)2  -0.14436  (4.399)  -0.13492  (4.029) 
(lnK)*(lnL)  I  0.28364  (6.934)  I  0.27704  (6.735) 
JLAGE  0.73809E-0  1 (6.098)  0.61687E-01  (4.677) 
NUAGE  0.22572E-01  (1.7 11)  O.l9220E-01  (1.451) 
PSAGE 
ESAGE 
0.69832E-01  (2.268)  0.64481E-01  (2.087) 
0.77504E-01  (6.125)  0.68852E-01  (4.914) 
JLAGE2  0.15 159E-02  (4.350)  0.24705E-02  (4.591) 
NUAGE2  -0.68 11  OE-03  (1.074)  -0.54878E-03  (0.860) 
PSAGE2 
ESAGE2 
-0.66008E-03  (0.93 1)  -0.33403E-03  (0.421) 
0.84803E-04  (0.124)  0.2 1208E-03  (0.309) 
JLAGE3  -0.80391E-05  (1.814)  -0.24435E-04  (2.907) 
NUAGE3  O.l0752E-04  (1.022)  0.88028E-05  (0.832) 
ESAGE3  I  0.23397E-04  (1.7 10)  I  O.l7261E-04  (1.241) 
JLAGE*NUAGE  O.l3260E-03  (0.371)  I  O.l6250E-03  (0.455) 
JLAGE*PSAGE  -O.l8276E-02  (1.186)  -0.20593E-02  (1.269) 
JLAGE*ESAGE  -0.22948E-02  (5.637)  -0.2 107 l E-02  (4.769) 
NUAGE*PSAGE  O.l4307E-02  (1.986)  O.l6747E-02  (2.130) 
NUAGE*ESAGE  -0.70814E-03  (2.509)  -0.72023E-03  (2.556) 
PSAGE*ESAGE  0.8501  lE-03  (0.539)  0.87277E-03  (0.55 1) 
UNAGE  0.96690E-01  (0.998)  0.18097  (1.737) 
UNAGE*  -O.l4645E-02  (2.354) 
UNAGE3  0.21163E-04  (2.286) 
Observations  1040  1040 
Number  of  firms  65  65 
Time  period  1970-1985  1970-1985 
R-squared  0.9645325  0.96474  15 
Notes:  Same  as Table  4A. Table  5 __  OLS  Estimates  Of  Translog  Production  Function,  Human  Resource 
Management  Practices  and  Unions  Interacted  (Dependent  Variable  =  InQ) 
Variable  (i)  (ii) 
InK  1.6202  (2.050)  1.7166  (2.190) 
1nL  I  -3.6124  (5.562)  -3.5679  (5.578) 
(  lnK)2  I  -0.78029E-01  (3.586)  I  -0.76707E-01  (3.570) 
(lnL)2  -0.15740  (4.685)  -0.12973  (3.861) 
(lnK)*(lnL)  0.28418  (6.838)  0.26350  (6.422) 
JLAGE  0.4396  1  E-O  1 (2.676)  -O.l4704E-01  (0.774) 
NUAGE  I  0.27422E-02  (0.191)  I  0.92267E-02  (0.653) 
PSAGE  O.l1473E-01  (0.323)  1 0.87364E-02  (0.250) 
ESAGE  0.10440  (5.185)  -O.l9381E-01  (0.669) 
JLAGE*  -0.30681E-03  (0.606)  1 -O.l8383E-02  (2.243) 
NUAGE*  I -O.l1553E-02  (1.841)  I  -O.l2901E-02  (2.066) 
PSAGE2  1 -0.243 17E-02  (3.904)  1 -0.25679E-02  (4.180) 
ESAGE2  O.l8082E-03  (0.246)  -O.l2921E-02  (1.675) 
JLAGE3  I  -O.l1048E-04  (2.537)  I  -O.l7103E-04  (2.028) 
NUAGE3  O.l2096E-04  (1.135)  O.l4761E-04  (1.403) 
ESAGE3  0.29978E-04  (2.230)  0.20176E-04  (1.490) 
UNAGE  0.12981  (1.272)  0.20095E-01  (0.183) 
UNAGE*JLAGE  0.23 17 1  E-02  (3.464)  0.61691E-02  (6.253) 
UNAGE*NUAGE  0.60728E-03  (1.57  1)  0.49394E-03  (1.287) 
UNAGE*PSAGE  O.l4523E-02  (1.322)  O.l5529E-02  (1.438) 
UNAGE*ESAGE  I  -0.29835E-02  (4.583)  I  0.86926E-03  (0.946) 
UNAGE*  I  -0.41264E-02  (5.010) 
UNAGE3  I  0.58840E-05  (0.609) 
Observations  I  1040  I  1040 
Number  of  firms  65  65 
Time  period  1970-1985  1970-1985 
R-squared  0.9635293  0.9648  199 
Notes:  Absolute  values  of  t statistics  are  in  parentheses.  All  models  include  time  dummies  and 
firm  specific  fixed  effects. 
Sources:  Human  Resource  Manarzement  Survev  of  Jauanese  Firms,  Nikkei  NEEDS,  and  Weekly 
Oriental  Economist. .  08 
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